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The neural circuitry of a broken promise
Abstract
Promises are one of the oldest human-specific psychological mechanisms fostering cooperation and
trust. Here, we study the neural underpinnings of promise keeping and promise breaking. Subjects first
make a promise decision (promise stage), then they anticipate whether the promise affects the
interaction partner's decision (anticipation stage), and are subsequently free to keep or break the promise
(decision stage). Findings revealed that the breaking of the promise is associated with increased
activation in the DLPFC, ACC, and amygdala, suggesting that the dishonest act involves an emotional
conflict due to the suppression of the honest response. Moreover, the breach of the promise can be
predicted by a perfidious brain activity pattern (anterior insula, ACC, inferior frontal gyrus) during the
promise and anticipation stage, indicating that brain measurements may reveal malevolent intentions
before dishonest or deceitful acts are actually committed.
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Summary 
Promises are one of the oldest human-specific psychological mechanisms fostering 
cooperation and trust. Here, we study the neural underpinnings of promise keeping and 
promise breaking. Subjects first make a promise decision (promise stage), then they anticipate 
whether the promise affects the interaction partner's decision (anticipation stage), and are 
subsequently free to keep or break the promise (decision stage). Findings revealed that the 
breaking of the promise is associated with increased activation in the DLPFC, ACC, and 
amygdala, suggesting that the dishonest act involves an emotional conflict due to the 
suppression of the honest response. Moreover, the breach of the promise can be predicted by a 
perfidious brain activity pattern (anterior insula, ACC, inferior frontal gyrus) during the 
promise and anticipation stage, indicating that brain measurements may reveal malevolent 
intentions before dishonest or deceitful acts are actually committed.   
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Introduction 
The human capacity to establish and enforce social norms is one of the decisive reasons for 
the uniqueness of human cooperation in the animal kingdom (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
Such norms constitute standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs on how 
individuals ought to behave in a given situation (Ellickson, 2001; Elster, 1989; Horne, 2001; 
Voss, 2001). In modern human societies a large cooperative infrastructure in the form of laws, 
impartial courts and the police exist which ensure that cooperative agreements, for example in 
the form of enforceable contracts, are kept (Fehr et al., 2002). However, it is obvious that in 
more than 90 percent of human history no such cooperative infrastructure existed. Thus, in 
ancient times, other more basic forms of cooperative agreements must have evolved in order 
to foster trust, cooperation, and partnership formation. One basic form of such cooperative 
agreements are promises, which might in fact constitute the precursor of enforceable contracts 
in contemporary times. Promises constitute oral and “non-binding” cooperative agreements, 
which have the goal to strengthen the belief in the exchange partner that one can be relied 
upon (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Despite their “non-binding” nature, many everyday 
social and economic exchange situations are still based on such oral promises. However, 
although important work examining the neural basis of social cooperation (Baumgartner et al., 
2008a; Behrens et al., 2008; Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2002; 
Rilling et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2006; Tabibnia et al., 2008), social comparison and 
competition (Decety et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2008; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Zink et al., 
2008), as well as social punishment and norm violations (Buckholtz et al., 2008; de Quervain 
et al., 2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007) exists, the brain systems involved in “non-binding” 
cooperative agreements still remain unknown. Studying the neural underpinnings of these 
“non-binding” cooperative agreements is particularly interesting because promises not only 
can be kept, but also broken. In fact, material incentives to cheat are ubiquitous in human 
societies and promises thus can also be misused in any kind of social or economic exchange 
situation between two or more individuals to cheat the exchange partner. Business people, 
politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental laboratory who make use of 
private information do not always do so honestly (Gneezy, 2005). 
 
In real life, one reason for keeping promises is to facilitate the future cooperation of potential 
exchange partners. However, we also believe that humans often keep promises because this is 
“the right thing to do”. Promises in this case are kept even in one-shot interaction, i.e., 
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although the keeping of the promise implies a net cost to the promise keeper. In fact, decisive 
evidence from behavioral experiments reveals a preference for promise keeping in one-shot 
situations (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). Thus, it is possible to 
distinguish two major motivations behind promise keeping: first, instrumental promise 
keeping for the purpose of facilitating future cooperation and second, intrinsic promise 
keeping for the purpose of “doing the right thing”. In this paper, we focused on the second 
motivational source of promise keeping.  
 
For that purpose, we applied a modified version of an economic trust game paradigm (Fig. 1) 
where subjects were completely free to decide whether to keep or to break a promise and 
where keeping or breaking a promise caused real monetary consequences (either benefits or 
costs) for both exchange partners. In this economic trust game paradigm, two subjects 
interacting anonymously are in the role of an investor (player A) and a trustee (player B). For 
the purpose of the study, we focused on the role of the trustee whose brain activity was 
measured in the brain scanner. The trustee first has to make a promise decision at the 
beginning of a series of three subsequent trust game trials, indicating whether he always, 
mostly, sometimes, or never plans to be trustworthy. In this context, being trustworthy means 
sharing the available money so that both players earn the same amount. Player A, the investor, 
is always informed about B's promise, and can then decide (based on B’s promise) whether to 
trust him and invest money or whether not to trust him and thus to keep the initial 
endowment. In case player A trusts player B, which is almost only the case if player B 
chooses a high promise level (see result section), the experimenter increases the amount 
player A sends by the factor of five. Player B can then decide to keep the promise and thus 
honor an investor’s trust by sending back half of the money, but he may also break the 
promise and thus violate the investor’s trust by not sharing. The experiment consisted of 4 
promise decisions with 3 subsequent trust game trials, meaning that subjects played a total of 
12 trust game trials in the promise condition (i.e. with a promise stage). As a control 
condition, we also implemented 12 trust game trials without the opportunity of making a 
promise decision. The trustee thus faced a total of 24 trust game trials with 24 different, 
anonymous and randomly selected interaction partners, half of the trials played with a 
promise stage and half of them without the opportunity to make a promise. Please note that 
the social interactions between trustees and interaction partners were genuine, that is, the 
trustees in the scanner faced the decisions of 24 real human interaction partners and their 
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choices actually affected the interaction partners' monetary payoffs (please see supplementary 
methods section for details). 
 
This design enables us to study three different processes that play an important role during 
“non-binding” cooperative agreements: (i) the process of promising, (ii) the process of 
anticipating the effect of the promise on the exchange partner’s decision to trust, and (iii) the 
decision-making process during which the decision to keep or to break the promise has to be 
implemented (see Fig. 2 for two timelines of trust game trials with and without opportunity to 
make a promise). We are particularly interested in whether the brain activity pattern differs at 
the different stages of the paradigm dependent on the decision to keep or to break the promise.  
 
In the experiment, the trustees were completely free to choose the strength of their promise 
(i.e. whether they promise always, mostly, sometimes, or never to share the money in the 
subsequent three trials) and to honor or break their promise. This led to two large behavioral 
clusters of individuals and only very few subjects did not belong to one of the two clusters. 
First, a substantial proportion of the subjects promised to share the money “always” but 
actually did not share it in the subsequent trust games (dishonest subjects). Second, another 
large proportion of the subjects also promised to share the money “always” but these subjects 
subsequently kept their promise (honest subjects). These two clusters of individuals also 
behaved very consistently when they could not make a promise, with the dishonest subjects 
almost never sharing the money, while the honest subjects almost always shared the money 
(for detailed statistical information, please see the behavioral analyses in the results section). 
 
This behavioral data pattern requires that special care be taken in the analysis of the 
neuroimaging data in order to control for payoff differences and differences in fairness related 
behaviors. In particular, it is not possible to make simple, direct comparisons between the 
dishonest and the honest subjects’ brain activity within the “promise possible” condition or 
within the “no promise possible” condition because such comparisons will be confounded 
with fairness differences and differences in material payoffs across the subjects. For this 
reason we computed the following serial subtraction term for each of the stages of our 
paradigm:  
[Promise (P) – No Promise (NoP)]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise (P) – No Promise (NoP)]Honest subjects, 
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where (P) indicates the “promise possible condition” and (NoP) the “no promise possible” 
condition. Note that this contrast controls for fairness and payoff differences because 
dishonest subjects make the same unfair choices and earn the same payoff across the “promise 
possible” and the “no promise possible” condition. Thus, the brain activity in the contrast (P – 
NoP)Dishonest subjects does not contain fairness and payoff-related brain activation. Likewise, 
honest subjects make the same fair choices and earn the same payoff across the “promise 
possible” and the “no promise possible” condition and, hence, the activity in the contrast (P – 
NoP)Honest subjects does not contain fairness and payoff-related brain activation. In addition, the 
serial subtraction term above controls for any unspecific effects of personality because the 
subjects in the “promise possible” condition have the same personality and display the same 
behavior as the subjects in the “no promise possible” condition. The above contrast thus rules 
out the impact of any personality differences on brain activation that have nothing to do with 
promise making and promise breaking.  
 
Using the described serial subtraction terms, our study provides the opportunity to answer the 
following three research questions:  
 
First, is it possible to differentiate between subjects who will break a promise and those 
subjects who will keep a promise based on the brain activity pattern during the promise stage 
of the paradigm, i.e. during a stage of the paradigm when the dishonest act might already be 
planned or prepared, but does not yet have to be implemented? In other words, can we predict 
whether subjects will keep or break the promise based on a perfidious brain activity pattern 
measured during the promise stage? We hypothesize that if subjects indeed already plan to 
break the promise at this stage of the paradigm, the misleading promise decision should evoke 
an emotional conflict. Such an emotional conflict might be indicated in the brain by increased 
activity in brain regions known to be involved in conflict (Baumgartner et al., 2008a; 
Botvinick et al., 1999) and in negative emotion processing (Amaral, 2003; Phillips et al., 
2003; Sanfey et al., 2003), including anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insular cortex, or 
amygdala.  
 
Second, there is another stage in the paradigm which takes place before subjects have to 
implement whether to keep or break their promise. Subjects receive the information during 
this stage that their investor is now deciding whether to trust or not. While the chosen promise 
level can positively affect the investor’s trust decision in trust game trials with promise stage, 
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this is not the case in trust game trials without promise stage. The investor's actual behavior is 
thus much more difficult to forecast in trust game trials without promise stage, and the 
negative outcome for the subjects (i.e., mistrust on the part of the investor) is more likely, 
making the anticipation process more uncertain and stressful. We therefore wondered whether 
this uncertain and stressful anticipation process might be more pronounced in subjects who 
intend to break rather than keep the promise. In other words, can we even differentiate 
between dishonest and honest subjects in a stage of our paradigm when no decision at all must 
be made? Recent brain imaging studies have consistently shown that the anticipation of such 
stressful and in particular uncertain events, that is events which can either be positive or 
negative, is primarily associated with increased activity in two brain regions, the bilateral 
anterior insula and right inferior frontal gyrus (Herwig et al., 2007a; Herwig et al., 2007b). If 
it is indeed the case that this uncertain and stressful anticipation process were more 
pronounced in subjects who plan to break the promise, we would expect brain activation in 
the regions mentioned above.  
 
Third, what are the differences in brain activity between breaking and keeping a promise 
when subjects must ultimately implement their decision? Previous studies on deception (for 
recent reviews, Sip et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2004) did not distinguish between the promise, 
anticipation, and the decision stage and focused instead on the act of implementing a lie. We 
argue that such a deceptive act involves a similar cognitive and emotional process as during 
the implementation of a broken promise. While deceptive subjects have to suppress the 
truthful response, dishonest subjects have to suppress the honest response. Either suppression 
most likely leads to an emotional conflict, which might include a guilty conscience or the fear 
of negative consequences in case the deceptive or dishonest act is detected. Deception 
paradigms have consistently associated this kind of conflictuous cognitive and emotional 
processes with increased activity of discrete anterior frontal regions and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC). In addition, more recent studies, which increased the subjects' emotional 
involvement by using more ecologically valid paradigms (e.g. mock-crime scenarios, guilty 
knowledge tests, Abe et al., 2007; Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005) rather 
consistently showed increased activity in emotion-related areas, such as the amygdala, insula, 
orbitofrontal cortex. Due to the similar cognitive and emotional processes assumed to take 
place in the promise breaker’s brain, we expect a similar activity pattern in the decision stage 
of our paradigm in the contrast between subjects who break and those who keep a promise. 
However, it is important to note that our paradigm has two major advantages compared to 
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previous deception paradigms (see Sip et al., 2008 for an extensive discussion of the 
limitations of previous deception paradigms), allowing us to study the mentioned processes in 
a more ecologically valid situation. First, while subjects in our paradigm were completely free 
to decide whether to break or keep the promise, subjects in all previous deception paradigms 
were forced to lie or to tell the truth. Second, while the dishonest act in our paradigm was 
embedded in a social exchange involving positive and negative consequences or costs for the 
exchange partners, the deceptive act in all previous deception studies did not have such 
consequences because the subjects were, without exception, interacting with the 
experimenter(s) (for the most "realistic" version see, Abe et al., 2007). Thus, in previous 
studies it was rather obvious to a subject that a lie could not cause any real harm or costs to 
the experimenter. However, lying without malevolent intent and without evoked 
consequences for the deceived individual lacks important elements of guilt, personal gain, and 
the psychological stress that often accompany the generation and enactment of a lie in the 
“real world” (Gneezy, 2005). For these reasons, our study is the first to explore the neural 
underpinnings of the emotional and cognitive processes discussed above using an ecologically 
valid paradigm where subjects could decide freely to break or keep the promise during a 
realistic social exchange involving positive or negative consequences for the exchange 
partners.  
 
Summing up, our paradigm enables us to answer the following questions: Do subjects who 
ultimately breach or keep a promise already have a differential brain activation pattern in 
stages of the paradigm during which the decision to break or keep the promise does not yet 
have to be implemented, but might already be prepared or planned? In other words, can we 
predict the dishonest act based on perfidious brain activity in the promise or anticipation stage 
of the paradigm? Moreover, do we find a similar differential brain activation pattern during 
the decision stage of our paradigm between subjects who break and keep the promise as in the 
discussed deception studies where subjects were forced to lie or to tell the truth and where 
lying had no negative consequences for the deceived individual?  
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Results 
Behavioral and psychometrical results 
Group classification  
Due to the fact that the trustees in our experiment were completely free to break or keep the 
promise, we examined in a first analysis whether our subjects can be classified into different 
subgroups based on their individual average return rate (see method section for details) in 
trust games played either with or without antecedent promise stage. For that purpose, we 
conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s method, squared Euclidean distance 
measures, see method section for details) using both return rates (with and without antecedent 
promise stage) as dependent variables. Results indicated a cluster solution with two strongly 
separated clusters (see dendrogram of supplementary Fig. 1). Inspection of the two clusters 
revealed two groups of subjects, i.e. those who either behaved trustworthily (referred to in the 
paper as honest group/subjects) or those who acted untrustworthily (referred to in the paper as 
dishonest group/subjects), irrespective of whether the trust games were played with or without 
antecedent promise stage (see Fig. 3A). A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with 
between-subject factor group (honest/dishonest) and within-subject factor promise stage (trust 
games with/without antecedent promise stage) revealed a highly significant main effect of 
group (F(1,24) = 102.80, p = 0.000, ETA2 = 0.93), but no interaction effect of group × promise 
stage (F(1,24) = 0.46, p = 0.501, ETA2 = 0.01), thus confirming that these two groups of 
subjects strongly differed in their return rate patterns, irrespective of whether the trust games 
were played with or without antecedent promise stage – a necessary precondition for the 
unconfounded analysis of the brain data as extensively discussed in the introduction section. 
The additionally discovered main effect of promise stage (F(1,24) = 8.86, p = 0.007, ETA2 = 
0.27) demonstrated that both groups of subjects showed some slight tendencies for increased 
return rates in trust game trials with antecedent promise stage (Fig. 3A). Finally, the very high 
positive correlation between the two return rates (r = .89, p = 0.000, ETA2 = 0.79) 
demonstrated not only that the two groups showed a consistent behavioral pattern but, 
importantly, that each individual subject alone did so as well (Fig. 3B). 
 
Promise level 
In a next analysis, we examined whether the two groups of subjects differed in their chosen 
promise level. The two lowest promise levels (sometimes or never send back half of the MUs) 
were only chosen three times in total (by three different subjects). Thus, subjects of each 
group chose one of the two highest promise levels during almost every promise decision, i.e. 
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either always or mostly send back half of the MUs. Fig. 3C illustrates the average of the two 
chosen highest promise levels (in percentage), broken down for the dishonest and honest 
group, respectively. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with between-subject factor 
group (dishonest/honest) and within-subject factor promise level (always/mostly send back 
MUs) revealed neither main effects (main effect of group: F(1,24) = 0.209, p = 0.652, ETA2 = 
0.01; main effect of promise level (F(1,24) = 3.264, p = 0.08, ETA2 = 0.12), nor an interaction 
effect (group × promise level: F(1,24) = 1.210, p = 0.282, ETA2 = 0.05), demonstrating that the 
two groups of subjects do not differ with respect to the chosen promise levels. Thus, the 
selection of different promise levels cannot explain the highly differential return rate pattern 
between the two groups during trust game trials with antecedent promise stage. 
 
Trust rate player A 
We next examined whether the differential return rates of player B are due to different trust 
rates of player A. We again calculated a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with between-
subject factor group (dishonest/honest) and within-subject factor promise stage (trust games 
with and without antecedent promise stage). Results revealed neither a main effect of group 
(F(1,24) = 0.957, p = 0.338, ETA2 = 0.04) nor an interaction effect of group × promise stage 
(F(1,24) = 0.131, p = 0.721, ETA2 = 0.005), suggesting that two groups experienced very 
similar trust rates of player A (Fig. 3D). On the other hand, the main effect of promise stage 
was significant (F(1,24) = 29.408, p = 0.000, ETA2 = 0.55), demonstrating, as expected, an 
increased trusting behavior of player A in trust game trials with promise stage (Fig. 3D). 
 
Response times 
Next, we examined Player B's response times during both the promise and decision stages 
(excluding those trials during which Player B could not make a decision because player A did 
not trust him) using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with between-subject factor group 
(dishonest/honest) and within-subject factor promise stage (trust games with and without 
antecedent promise stage). We found no effect of group on response times (main effects of 
group and interaction effects of group × promise stage: all p > 0.360). The main effect of the 
factor promise stage during the decision trial was also not significant (p > 0.254), but, as 
expected, this main effect was significant during the promise stage (F(1,24) = 17.369, p = 0.000, 
ETA2 = 0.42), indicating an increase in response times during promise stages in which 
subjects actually had to decide about their promise level (mean ± SE: 3.14 seconds ± 0.19) 
compared to the other condition during which they just had to press a button without 
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reflecting about the promise level (mean ± SE: 2.33 seconds ± 0.18; see supplementary 
method section for details).  
 
Personality characteristics and degree of psychological symptoms  
Finally, we checked whether our two groups of subjects differ in main personality 
characteristics (e.g. neuroticism, extraversion, Machiavellism) and degree of psychological 
symptoms (e.g. depression, anxiety, aggression/hostility). For that purpose, we administered 
the “Brief Symptom Inventory” (BSI) questionnaire, the “NEO-Five-Factor-Inventory” 
(NEO-FFI) questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, 1992) and the Machiavelli questionnaire 
(Christie and Geis, 1970). Importantly, all scales showed no group differences (BSI: all p > 
0.33, NEO-FFI: all p > 0.30, Machiavelli questionnaire: all p > 0.21). Furthermore, 
correlations of return rates with these personality and psychological symptom scales did not 
reveal any significant result (BSI: all p > 0.38, NEO-FFI: all p > 0.22, Machiavelli 
questionnaire: all p > 0.29; please see supplementary Tables S5-S7 for detailed statistical 
information to each scale). These findings suggest that the reported differential brain activity 
patterns (see below) are not driven by specific (related to the act of promising) personality 
differences between promise breakers and promise keepers, but that they rather reflect the 
(intended or actual act of) breaking a promise relative to the (intended or actual act of) 
keeping a promise, regardless of the subjects’ personality characteristics. However, please 
note that the questionnaire evidence cannot completely rule out that an unknown personality 
or demographic factor not directly assessed by the questionnaires could contribute to the 
difference in the subjects’ tendencies toward promise keeping or breaking. 
 
Brain imaging results 
Promise stage 
In a first brain imaging analysis we were interested whether it is possible to differentiate 
between honest and dishonest subjects based on their brain activation pattern in the promise 
stage. This stage is of particular interest because, as we show in the behavioral results section, 
the two groups of subjects do not differ in their behavior, i.e. they chose the same promise 
level and even need the same amount of time to implement their decision. Furthermore, the 
promise stage takes place at a time point when the decision to be dishonest or honest does not 
yet have to be implemented, thus still providing the opportunity to reconsider and change the 
decision. It is therefore an open question whether subjects already show a perfidious brain 
activation pattern indicating the planned breach of promise at this time point. Comparing 
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dishonest subjects with honest subjects (using the serial subtraction term: [Promise - No 
Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects) indeed revealed a highly 
differential brain activation pattern, i.e. dishonest subjects compared to honest subjects 
showed increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and bilateral in the inferior 
frontal gyrus / anterior insula region (referred to as frontoinsular cortex in the following; Fig. 
4 A and B, supplementary Table 1). In contrast, calculating the reversed serial subtraction 
term ( [Promise - No Promise]Honest subjects minus [Promise – No Promise]Dishonest subjects) showed 
no increased activation in honest compared to dishonest subjects, even at a strongly lowered p 
< 0.05 (uncorrected). 
 
In order to clarify whether the revealed brain activation pattern is not only group, but also 
stage-specific, we created functional regions of interests (see supplementary method section 
for details) in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex and extracted, based on these ROIs, 
Beta-estimates in all stages of the paradigm, including the anticipation and decision stages 
(decision phase A + B). We calculated independent t-tests based on these Beta-estimates in 
order to check for group differences in these brain regions. We found no other stage of the 
paradigm in which these regions showed a differential group effect (ACC: all p > 0.29; right 
frontoinsular cortex: all p > 0.26; left frontoinsular cortex: all p > 0.42), indicating that this 
neural correlate is both group-dependent and stage-dependent; that is, only subjects of the 
dishonest group who later intend to break their promises in the decision stage react with 
increased activation in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex during the promise stage.  
 
Anticipation stage  
In a next analysis, we were interested whether dishonest and honest subjects also show 
differential brain activations in the anticipation stage of the paradigm, that is in a stage of the 
paradigm during which no decision related the dishonest or honest act has to be made. We 
focused in our analysis in particular on the anticipation process during trust game trials 
without antecedent promise stage. In these trials, in contrast to trials with antecedent promise 
stage, choosing a high promise level cannot influence the investor's actual behavior, making 
the anticipation process more uncertain and stressful. We indeed found that the two groups 
differ in this uncertain and stressful anticipation process. Comparing dishonest with honest 
subjects (using the serial subtraction term: [No Promise - Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [No 
Promise – Promise]Honest subjects) revealed increased brain activation in the right anterior insula 
and right inferior frontal gyrus in dishonest subjects (IFG; Fig. 5 A and B, supplementary 
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Table S2). In contrast, calculating the reversed serial subtraction term showed no increased 
activation in honest compared to dishonest subjects, even at a strongly lowered p < 0.05 
(uncorrected), suggesting that this anticipation process is more pronounced in subjects who 
behave dishonestly. 
 
In a next step, we again examined how stage-specific this activation pattern actually is. For 
that purpose, we extracted Beta-estimates based on functional ROIs (IFG and anterior insula) 
for all stages of the paradigm. Independent t-tests revealed no differential group effect in these 
brain regions during any other stage of the paradigm (IFG: all p > 0.19; anterior insula: all p > 
0.44), again indicating that the activation in these brain regions is not only group, but also 
stage dependent.  
 
Decision stage  
We used two different regression models to examine the brain activation pattern during the 
decision stage. In a first model of the decision stage, we were interested in brain regions 
showing a sustained activation over both decision phases A+B (decision phase A: revealment 
of player A’s trust decision, decision phase B: player B is reminded of his promise, see Fig. 2 
for a detailed explanation of these two phases). For that purpose, we created a decision 
regressor which modeled the decision epoch as a whole, i.e. from onset decision screen in 
decision phase A until implementation of the decision via button press in decision phase B 
(mean duration 10.13 seconds). In a second model of the decision stage, we modeled decision 
phases A and B separately, in order to examine whether the two phases can be differentiated 
by a unique brain activation pattern (for details of the two different models please see 
supplementary method section). 
 
Examining the decision stage as whole (using the decision regressor of the first model) by 
comparing the dishonest subjects with the honest subjects (using the serial subtraction term: 
[Promise - No Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects) revealed only 
one brain region that showed a differential activity: the dishonest subjects showed sustained 
activation in the ventral part of the striatum during the whole decision stage (Fig. 6, 
supplementary Table S3). In contrast, a separate examination of the two decision phases 
(based on the decision regressors of the second model) using the same serial subtraction term 
revealed increased activation in dishonest subjects in the ACC and left DLPFC (at the border 
between DLPFC and VLPFC) during decision phase A (Fig. 7 A and B, supplementary Table 
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S3), while the same group of subjects showed increased activation in the left amygdala during 
decision phase B (Fig. 7 C, supplementary Table S3). We observed no increased brain 
activation using the reversed serial subtraction terms in honest compared to dishonest 
subjects, even at a strongly lowered p < 0.05 (uncorrected).  
 
In order to corroborate the described specificity in the decision stage, we created functional 
ROIs and extracted Beta-estimates separately for all three decision regressors (decision phase 
A+B, decision phase A, and decision phase B). Independent t-tests confirmed the suggested 
specificity with respect to the time point of differential group activity during the decision 
stage for all ROIs (ventral striatum, DLPFC, ACC and amygdala; please see supplementary 
Table S4 for details). Independent t-tests of Beta-estimates based on the same functional ROIs 
of the decision stage also showed no differential group effect during any other stage (promise 
and anticipation) of the paradigm (ACC: all p > 0.08; DLPFC: all p > 0.32; amygdala: all p > 
0.45; ventral striatum: all p > 0.93). 
 
Finally, we conducted additional analyses presented in the supplementary material in order to 
further control for potential confounding factors (supplementary analysis S1), to further 
corroborate the stage-specificity of the activity patterns (supplementary analysis S2), and to 
examine the activity in the decision stage with slightly different decision regressors 
(supplementary analysis S3). These three additional analyses confirmed the findings reported 
above. 
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Discussion 
In order to study the neural underpinnings of “non-binding” cooperative agreements in the 
form of promises, we used a social interaction paradigm derived from game theory in which 
subjects were completely free to decide whether to break or to keep the promise and in which 
breaking or keeping a promise caused monetary consequences (benefits or costs) for both 
exchange partners. We found that all stages of the paradigm revealed a highly specific brain 
activation pattern, enabling us to differentiate between subjects who break a promise and 
those who keep a promise (see Fig. 4-7). Importantly, the applied serial subtraction term 
analysis (see introduction and result section) rules out the impact of any personality 
differences on brain activation that have nothing to do with promise making and promise 
breaking. Furthermore, the obtained questionnaire evidence favors the view that the reported 
differential brain activity patterns are also not driven by specific (related to the act of 
promising) personality differences between promise breakers and promise keepers, but rather 
that they reflect the (intended or actual) act of breaking a promise relative to the (intended or 
actual) act of keeping a promise, regardless of the subjects' personality characteristics. 
However, please note that the questionnaire evidence does not completely rule out that other 
unknown personality factors, that are not directly assessed by the questionnaires, contribute to 
the difference in the subjects’ tendencies toward promise keeping or breaking. 
 
Two stages of the paradigm allow us to look for differences in brain activity between honest 
and dishonest subjects during time points when the subjects do not yet have to implement the 
decision to break or to keep the promise. The stage of particular interest in this regard is the 
promise stage of the paradigm because behavioral findings in our study showed that dishonest 
and honest subjects do not differ with regard to their chosen promise level, and even the 
response times for implementing the promise decision are equal. Nevertheless, the brain 
activation pattern is highly differential, that is subjects who will break their promise at later 
stages of the paradigm already show increased activation in the ACC and bilateral 
frontoinsular cortex. The ACC has been demonstrated to be consistently implicated in conflict 
monitoring and cognitive control both during social (Baumgartner et al., 2008a; Delgado et 
al., 2005) and non-social paradigms (Botvinick et al., 1999; Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter et 
al., 1998). The insula (including frontoinsular cortex) has been shown to be involved in the 
mapping of body-related sensations, including temperature, pain, proprioception, and viscera 
(for review see, Craig, 2002). Consistent with this mapping hypothesis, insula activations 
were mainly found during aversive emotional experiences associated with strong visceral and 
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somatic sensations such as the experience of unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 
2008), the threat of punishment (Spitzer et al., 2007), and the anticipation of negative and 
unknown emotional events (Herwig et al., 2007a; Herwig et al., 2007b). Taken together, the 
increased activation in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex suggests that subjects who 
behave dishonestly already form their intent to break the promise during the promise stage. 
We assume that this intention leads to a decision conflict and associated (aversive) emotional 
experiences, represented in the brain in the ACC and frontoinsular cortex. The aversive 
emotional experience might include the guilty conscience towards the exchange partner whom 
the promise will intentionally mislead. Interestingly, both of these brain regions are thought to 
belong to a reflexive, automatic system of social cognition proposed by Lieberman and 
colleagues (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute and Lieberman, 2006). We thus speculate that due to 
the reflexive mode of operation of these brain regions, it might be rather difficult or even 
impossible for dishonest subjects to suppress this reaction pattern in the brain voluntarily, i.e. 
not to “signal” their planned breach of promise with a perfidious brain activation pattern. 
 
Another stage of the paradigm takes place before the dishonest act has to be implemented. 
During this stage, the subjects do not even have to make a decision, they are merely informed 
that their exchange partners are now deciding whether to trust or not and the subjects can thus 
do nothing but anticipate the outcome of the investor’s trust decision. Interestingly, the two 
groups (dishonest/honest) do not differ in hypothesized regions of interests during anticipation 
trials with antecedent promise stage (see supplementary Table S2 for the two small 
differences in other regions). In these trials, choosing a high promise level can influence the 
investor's trusting behavior (and all subjects did so), thus reducing the probability that the 
investor will not trust. In contrast, the investor’s trusting behavior cannot be affected in trials 
without antecedent promise stage and the outcome of the trust decision is therefore much 
more difficult to forecast, making the anticipation trial more emotional and stressful. Recent 
brain imaging studies (Herwig et al., 2007a; Herwig et al., 2009; Herwig et al., 2007b) have 
shown that the anticipation of such negative and unforeseeable (either negative or positive) 
emotional events is mainly associated with increased activation in the bilateral anterior insula 
and right IFG. Moreover, these studies show that personality traits of depression and 
neuroticism, both of which are associated with negative expectations towards future events, 
correlate positively with these brain regions during the anticipation trials, i.e. the higher the 
score in these personality measures, the higher the activation in the bilateral anterior insula 
and right IFG. We found that similar to subjects with higher depressive or neuroticism scores, 
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subjects who behaved dishonestly reacted to the unpredictable and thus emotional and 
stressful anticipation stage of our paradigm with increased activation in the same brain 
regions (right anterior insula and right IFG). This suggests that social exchange situations 
associated with a lack of control and uncertainty are more pronounced and more intensely 
experienced in subjects who intend to behave dishonestly, which might indicate that they 
more strongly anticipate a negative outcome (e.g. mistrust on the part of the investor) in 
unpredictable social situations than subjects who intend to behave honestly. Taken together, 
our findings demonstrate that the dishonest subjects can be differentiated from honest subjects 
even in stages of the paradigm during which no decision related to the dishonest act has to be 
made. 
 
The stage during which the dishonest or honest act actually has to be implemented revealed an 
activity pattern in accordance with our assumption that the breaking of a promise and the 
telling of a lie involve similar cognitive and emotional processes and associated brain 
activation patterns. In detail, we argued that while deceptive subjects have to suppress the 
truthful response, dishonest subjects have to suppress the honest response. In line with this 
assumption, our study, along with most deception paradigms (e.g. Abe et al., 2006; Kozel et 
al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2001; Spence et 
al., 2008), revealed increased activity in brain regions of the lateral PFC which are known to 
play an essential role in the control and suppression of (inappropriate) cognitions and 
behaviors (e.g. Aron, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2008b; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Beeli et al., 
2008; Jancke et al., 2008; Spitzer et al., 2007). Furthermore, we argued that the suppression of 
both the truthful and the honest response most likely leads to an emotional conflict in the 
deceptive and dishonest subjects. Again corroborating this assumption, our study and most of 
previous deception studies (e.g. Abe et al., 2006; Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005; 
Lee et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2001) demonstrated 
increased activity in the ACC, which constitutes the brain region most consistently associated 
with cognitive and emotional conflict processing and resolving (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 
2008a; Botvinick et al., 1999; Etkin et al., 2006). Taken together, our paradigm, which 
substantially improved previous deception paradigms (subjects in our paradigm were free to 
decide and their decisions caused both positive and negative consequences for the exchange 
partners, see introduction section), confirmed the activation of the aforementioned brain 
regions during the assumed cognitive and emotional processes involved in the implementation 
of the deceptive or dishonest acts. Moreover, our paradigm also substantiated the assumption 
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that truthful responding comprises a relative baseline in human cognition and communication 
(i.e. truthful responding compared to lying does not require an activity increase in any single 
brain region, Spence et al., 2004), because, similar to most deception paradigms, we did not 
find any activity increase during the decision stage of our paradigm in subjects who behaved 
honestly compared to those who behaved dishonestly. Furthermore, we could extend these 
negative findings to all other stages of our paradigm (promise and anticipation stages). Thus, 
in spite of the fact that our honest subjects freely chose to keep their promises in a “realistic” 
social exchange, no specific neural correlate of honesty was observed in any stage of the 
paradigm, even at a strongly lowered significance threshold.  
 
Besides increased activity in the ACC and DLPFC, the amygdala demonstrated increased 
activity during the breaking of a promise in the decision stage of our paradigm. Whereas 
activity in the ACC and DLPFC belong to the most replicated findings in neuroimaging 
studies on deception, up to now only three of the deception studies reported increased 
activation of the amygdala – a brain region widely acknowledge to play an important role in 
emotion (Phan et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2003) and in particular fear processing (Adolphs et 
al., 2005; Amaral, 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2008a). In two of these studies, subjects had to 
detect deceptive intentions; the findings indicated that the crucial factor for amygdala 
activation is the subject's involvement, that is, amygdala activation was only observed if the 
subject was the target of the deceit (Grezes et al., 2006; Grezes et al., 2004). Only one study, 
which focused on the neural activities of those telling lies, reported activation of the 
amygdala. Of all conducted deception studies, this study (Abe et al., 2007) used a paradigm 
which might get closest to real life deception by introducing a clever twist in the paradigm. 
This twist consisted of having a second experimenter tell the subject to disobey the first 
experimenter, i.e. when the first experimenter instructed the subject to tell the truth, the 
second experimenter secretly asked the subject to deceive. Thus, we conclude that increasing 
the subjects' emotional involvement by creating a “realistic” social situation seems to trigger 
the amygdala response in the study by Abe and colleagues (2007) and our paradigm – notably 
in a very similar ventral part of the left amygdala. Furthermore, the time point of amygdala 
activation in our paradigm provides some additional evidence as to which process might have 
evoked the amygdala activation in both studies. This evidence can be derived from the fact 
that we only found increased activation of the amygdala during decision phase B, i.e. when 
subjects were reminded of their promise they were going to break. This suggests that it is not 
the dishonest or deceptive act per se (including the inhibition of the honest/truthful response 
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and associated conflict), but rather the deliberate confrontation with the promise towards the 
interaction partner, which might drive the amygdala activation. Whereas subjects in our 
paradigm explicitly had to make a promise towards the interaction partner, the promise was 
more implicit in nature in the study of Abe and colleagues (2007), i.e. subjects implicitly 
promised the first experimenter to obey his instructions. Taken together, we argue that the 
spontaneous (study of Abe et al.) or triggered (our paradigm) reminder of a promise one is not 
allowed (study of Abe et al.) or willing (our paradigm) to keep evokes an emotional response 
in deceptive or dishonest subject, which might include a guilty conscience towards the 
interaction partner and/or a fearful reaction that the deceptive or dishonest act will be 
detected.  
 
Finally, we found increased activation in the right ventral striatum during the breaking of a 
promise in the decision stage of our paradigm. Similar to the observed activity of the 
amygdala, only very few of the discussed deception studies reported activations in the 
striatum (e.g. Nunez et al., 2005); these activations are commonly observed during tasks that 
require individuals to suppress a prepotent or frequent response (Aron et al., 2007; Casey et 
al., 2002). Thus, the activity in the striatum may reflect, similar to the activation in the left 
DLPFC, the inhibition of the impulse to answer truthfully or honestly. However, we suggest 
an alternative interpretation for the striatum activation in our paradigm for the following 
reasons. First, in contrast to the DLPFC activation, which was restricted to phase A of the 
decision stage, we observed sustained activation in the ventral striatum during the entire time 
window of the decision stage, suggesting a different cognitive or affective process. Second, in 
contrast to the few deception studies which reported activation in this brain region, our study 
used a social exchange paradigm in which subjects deliberately decided to break the promise 
with the goal of increasing their monetary payoff at the expense of the exchange partner. Due 
to the well-known role of the striatum in social (e.g. Fliessbach et al., 2007; Rilling et al., 
2004) and non-social (Delgado et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2007) reward processing and its strong 
impact on decision-making (de Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005; Delgado et al., 
2008; for a recent review, Fehr and Camerer, 2007; King-Casas et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 
2007), we thus speculate that the activation in the striatum might represent the motivational, 
appetitive component of the dishonest act. In other words, subjects might be motivated to 
break the promise because the activation in the ventral striatum reinforces the dishonest act 
and thus might act as a counterbalance against the aversive emotions (e.g. guilty conscience) 
and potential negative consequences in case the deception should be detected. We suggest 
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designing future studies that allow examining whether the former, the latter, or both 
interpretations for the striatum activity apply. 
 
Summing up, this is the first study that explores the neural correlate of “non-binding” 
cooperative agreements in the form of a promise – one of the oldest human-specific 
psychological mechanisms fostering trust, cooperation, and partnership formation. In order to 
study this psychological mechanism, we applied a social interaction paradigm derived from 
game theory in which subjects were completely free to decide whether to keep or break the 
promise and in which the dishonest act included both benefits for the subjects and costs for 
the exchange partners. Findings revealed that each of the three processes playing an important 
role during “non-binding” cooperative agreements is associated with a unique brain activation 
pattern, allowing us to discriminate dishonest from honest subjects. In detail, we found (1) 
that the implementation of the dishonest act is associated with increased activity in brain 
regions known to be involved in cognitive control and conflict processing, including the 
DLPFC and ACC. In addition, we also demonstrated (2) increased activation during this stage 
of the paradigm in emotion-related brain regions, including amygdala and ventral striatum. 
We suggest that the amygdala activation may represent the guilty conscience or the fear that 
the deceptive act could be detected, whereas the activity in the ventral striatum might 
represent the motivating and driving force behind the deceptive act. Finally, one of the most 
important findings concerns (3) the predictive power of “perfidious” brain activation patterns 
in the ACC, bilateral frontoinsular cortex, and right IFG during the promise or the anticipation 
stages for the final decision whether to keep or break the promise. Even though during the 
promise stage the behavior of those subjects who ultimately cheat their exchange partner and 
those who finally keep their promise does not differ – both types of subject promise to keep 
the informal agreement – the brain activations of the “cheaters” and the “promise keepers” 
show very distinct patterns during the promise stage. These findings contribute to a recent 
debate about whether data from neuroscience are relevant for sciences such as economics that 
are primarily interested in understanding and predicting behavior (Camerer et al., 2005; 
Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). The fact that the cheaters’ brain activations during the 
promise and anticipation stages differ unambiguously from those of the promise keepers, even 
though both of them perform the same behavior, means that the brain activations alone and 
not just the observed behaviors are capable of predicting the dishonest act. Thus, our study 
shows that data from neuroscience can provide important insights into behavior that extend 
beyond that which purely behavioral data can detect.  
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Methods 
Subjects 
A total of 34 healthy male students from different universities in Zurich participated in the 
study. 8 of the participants had to be excluded from the analyses; one subject due to scanner 
malfunctions and another 7 subjects due to design constraints (see supplementary methods for 
details), resulting in 26 male subjects (mean age ± s.d., 23.5 ± 2.5) for the analyses of the 
behavioral and brain imaging data. All subjects were free of chronic diseases, mental 
disorders, medication, and drug or alcohol abuse. The study was carried out in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki principles and approved by the institutional ethics committee. 
All subjects gave written, informed consent and were informed of their right to discontinue 
participation at any time. Subjects received a lump sum payment of CHF 40 for participating 
in the experiment plus the additional money earned during the trust game trials (exchange rate 
10 money units = 2.5 Swiss Franc, that is about $ 2.50).  
 
Design  
In total, subjects played 24 trust game trials in the role of a trustee (Player B) against 24 
different and anonymous human interaction partners in the role of an investor (Player A, see 
Fig. 1, 2 and supplementary methods for details). In half of these trials, subjects had to make a 
promise for three subsequently played trust game trials whether they always, mostly, 
sometimes or never plan to send back half of the money so that both players earn the same 
amount. Importantly, Player A was always informed about B's promise, and B could keep the 
promise, but he was also allowed to break it. In total, player B made four promise decisions 
and each of these decisions held for the three subsequent trust game trials. There were also 
four instances during which Player B was informed that he could not decide on a promise 
level; the three succeeding trust game trials were thus played without promise. Trust game 
trials with and without antecedent promise stage were presented counterbalanced and pseudo-
randomized.  
 
Behavioral analysis 
We created two return rate indexes for the behavioral data (return decisions) – one for trust 
game trials with antecedent promise stage and one for trials without antecedent promise stage. 
The index measures player B’s average return rate for the trust game trials in which player A 
trusted, i.e. the percentage of cases in which B proved trustworthy and equalized payoffs. 
Using these two behavioral indexes, we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis based on the 
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Ward method (using the squared Euclidean distance measure) in order to classify our subjects 
into different subgroups. This cluster analysis revealed a cluster solution with two strongly 
separated clusters (see dendrogram of supplementary Fig. 1). Inspection of the two clusters 
revealed two groups of subjects, i.e. those who either behaved trustworthily (referred to in the 
paper as honest group/subjects) or those who acted untrustworthily (referred to in the paper as 
dishonest group/subjects). Please see supplementary methods section for further information 
on the analyses of the behavioral data, including promise levels, response times and trust rates 
of player A. 
 
fMRI acquisition  
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole body MR Scanner (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips SENSE head 
coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1–weighted transversal images (0.75 mm 
slice thickness). For functional imaging, a total of 380 volumes were obtained using a 
SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE; (Pruessmann et al., 1999)) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging 
sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. 42 axial slices were acquired covering the whole 
brain with a slice thickness of 3mm; no inter-slice gap; interleaved acquisition; TR = 3000 
ms; TE = 35ms; flip angle = 77°, field of view = 220mm; matrix size = 80 × 80. We used a 
tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 30° to the AC-PC line in order to optimize 
functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes.  
  
fMRI analysis 
Data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using SPM5. For preprocessing, all images 
were realigned to the first volume, corrected for motion artifacts and time of acquisition 
within a TR, normalized into standard stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal 
Neurological Institute), and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian 
kernel. For statistical analysis, we performed random-effects analyses on the functional data 
for the promise, anticipation and decision stage. For that purpose, we estimated 2 general 
linear models (GLMs) and computed linear contrasts of regression coefficients at the 
individual subject level. In order to enable inference at the group level, we calculated second-
level group contrasts using independent t-tests with factor group (dishonest/honest group), 
separately for each stage of the paradigm. We applied an uncorrected p-value of 0.005 
combined with a cluster-size threshold of 10 voxels to our apriori regions of interests (see 
introduction section). Furthermore, we checked whether our a priori regions of interests 
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survive small volume family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05. Crucially, all our 
regions of interests survived this correction procedure. Please see supplementary methods 
section for additional information on all conducted statistical analyses, including a more 
detailed description of the applied GLMs and multiple comparison corrections. 
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Figure 1: Trust game with antecedent promise stage. Depicted are the different stages of 
the economic trust game with antecedent promise stage. In the trust game used in the present 
study, two players A and B interact anonymously with each other during one trial. A receives 
an endowment of 2 money units (MUs) at the beginning of each trial, whereas B receives 
nothing. A has to make the first decision. He can send his endowment of two MUs to B (case 
1), or he can keep his endowment (case 2). If A trusts B and sends his endowment (case 1), 
the experimenter increases the amount sent by the factor of five, so that B receives ten MUs. 
At that moment, B has ten MUs and A has nothing. B then has the choice of sending back 
nothing or half of the ten MUs. Thus, if B acts trustworthily and sends back half, both players 
earn five MUs, but if B keeps all the money, he earns ten MUs and A, who trusted B, earns 
nothing. In case 2, that is, if A does not trust B, A keeps his or her endowment of two MUs 
and B gets nothing. In total 24 such trust game trials are played with different, randomly 
selected interaction partners. In half of the played rounds, B has to make a promise for three 
subsequent trials whether he always, mostly, sometimes or never plans to send back half of the 
money. A is always informed about B's promise, and B can keep the promise, but he is also 
allowed to break it. Color coding: blue color = promise stage of player B; orange color = 
decision stages of either player A or B. Note that player A’s decision stage is at the same time 
player B’s anticipation stage during which player B is informed that player A is now deciding 
(see Fig. 2); yellow color = outcome stage player A and B.  
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Figure 2: Timeline for two trials of the trust game with and without antecedent promise 
stage. The trust game trials start with a fixation epoch which lasts for 10-12 seconds 
(randomly jittered). After this fixation epoch, the promise stage begins in 8 of 24 trust trials 
during which the subject has to implement his promise level for three subsequent trust game 
trials (within a time restriction of 9 seconds, mean: ~ 3 s) or during which he receives the 
information that he can not decide about a promise level. After the promise stage, there is 
another fixation epoch lasting for 10-12 seconds (randomly jittered). Then the anticipation 
stage begins which last for 6 seconds during which the subject is informed that his assigned 
player A is now deciding. This anticipation stage is followed by the decision stage which is 
divided into three parts. First, the subject is informed for 6 seconds whether player A trusted 
him or not (not depicted). The subject is then reminded on the same decision screen of his 
promise or that he could not make a promise for the current trial. This information is 
presented for 3 seconds. Finally, after 9 seconds in total, the decision options are presented on 
the same screen, allowing the subject to implement his decision within a time restriction of 7 
seconds. The first 6 seconds of the decision stage are referred to in the paper as decision phase 
A, whereas the second 3 seconds until button press are referred to as decision phase B 
(average response time from the beginning of decision phase A until button press: ~ 10 s). 
Finally, a trust game trial is completed by the profit stage (not depicted), which presents the 
outcome of both players for the current trust game trial for 6 seconds, and provides the 
information that a new player A is assigned to the subject.  
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Figure 3: Behavioral results. (A) Depicted are means ± SE of player B’s return rates (in 
percentage), broken down for groups (dishonest/honest) and promise stages (trust games 
with/without antecedent promise stage). Findings indicate strong group differences in return 
rates irrespective of whether trust games are played with or without antecedent promise stage. 
(B) High positive correlation (r = .89, p = 0.000) between return rates of trust games played 
with and without antecedent promise stage. (C) Depicted are means ± SE of player B’s 
promise levels (in percentage), broken down for groups (dishonest/honest) and the two 
highest promise levels (always send back/mostly send back). Findings indicate that both 
groups of subjects predominantly chose very high promise levels despite very different return 
rate patterns. (D) Depicted are means ± SE of player A’s trust rates (in percentage), broken 
down for groups (dishonest/honest) and promise stage (trust games with/without antecedent 
promise stage). Findings indicate no group differences in trust rates, but an increased trust 
rate, as expected, during trust game trials with antecedent promise stage.  
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Figure 4: Differential brain activation pattern during the promise stage. (A) Depicted on 
sagittal and coronal slices is the increased activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects 
(based on the serial subtraction term: [Promise - No Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise – 
No Promise] Honest subjects ) in the ACC (BA 24, x = -6, y = 33, z = 6) and bilateral frontoinsular 
cortex (BA 47/13, x = -30, y = 24, z = -18; x = 42, y = 15, z = -24) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent 
threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes depicted at p < 0.01). Despite the fact that both 
groups of subjects implement the same promise decision, the dishonest subjects who will 
deceive at the following decision stages already show a perfidious brain activation pattern 
during the promise stage. Bar plots representing contrast estimates (Promise > No Promise) 
of functional ROIs (see method section for details) demonstrate that the differential group 
effect in all regions is mainly based on increased activation in the dishonest group in the 
Promise compared to the No Promise condition at p ≤ .005 (***) or p ≤.001 (****). (B) 
Return rates show a strong negative correlation with ACC (r = -.68, p < 0.001) and bilateral 
frontoinsular cortex (right frontoinsular cortex: r = -.72, p < 0.001; left frontoinsular cortex 
[not depicted]: r = -.66, p < 0.001) using the same functional ROIs as in (A). 
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Figure 5: Differential brain activation pattern during the anticipation stage. (A) 
Depicted on sagittal slices is the increased activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects 
(based on the serial subtraction term: [No Promise - Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [No Promise 
– Promise] Honest subjects) in the right IFG (BA 45, x = 57, y = 12, z = 6) and right anterior insula 
(BA 13, x = 45, y = 0, z = 6) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display 
purposes depicted at p < 0.01). Despite the fact that both groups are confronted with the same 
uncertainty during the anticipation of Player’s A trusting behavior (whether or not he trusts), 
the brain activation pattern of the dishonest subjects suggests a more pronounced anticipation 
process. Bar plots representing contrast estimates (No Promise > Promise) of functional ROIs 
(see method section for details) demonstrate that the differential group effect in all regions is 
mainly based on increased activation in the dishonest subjects in the No Promise compared to 
the Promise condition at p ≤ .01 (**). (B) Return rates show a strong negative correlation with 
right IFG (r = -.61, p < 0.001) and right anterior insula (r = -.64, p < 0.001) using the same 
functional ROIs as in (A). 
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Figure 6: Differential brain activation pattern during the decision stage with combined 
modeled decision phases A and B. Depicted on a coronal slice is the increased activation in 
dishonest compared to  honest subjects (based on the serial subtraction term: [Promise - No 
Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise – No Promise] Honest subjects ) in the right ventral striatum 
(x = 24, y = 12, z = 0) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes 
depicted at p < 0.01). This finding suggests that dishonest subjects have increased activity in 
the ventral striatum during the whole decision process. Bar plots representing contrast 
estimates (Promise > No Promise) of functional ROIs (see method section for details) 
demonstrate that the differential group effect is mainly based on increased activation in 
dishonest subjects in the Promise compared to the No Promise condition at p ≤ 0.005 (***). 
The scatter plot demonstrates that the return rates are negatively correlated with activity in the 
right ventral striatum (r = -.49, p < 0.01) using the same functional ROI. 
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Figure 7: Differential brain activation pattern during the decision stage with separately 
modeled decision phases A and B. Depicted on sagittal and coronal slices is the increased 
activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects (based on the serial subtraction term: 
[Promise - No Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [Promise – No Promise] Honest subjects ) during 
decision phase A or B at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes 
depicted at p < 0.01). In decision phase A increased activation was found in the (A) ACC (BA 
24, x = -6, y = 27, z = 18) and (B) left DLPFC (BA 10/46, x = -39, y = 54, z = 15), whereas in 
decision phase B increased activity was found in the (C) left amygdala (x = -30, y = 0, z = -
21). Bar plots representing contrast estimates (Promise > No Promise) of functional ROIs 
(see method section for details) confirm this suggested activity pattern by illustrating the 
group-dependent and phase-dependent activity of these brain regions during the two phases of 
the decision stage. Asterisks indicate significantly increased activity in dishonest subjects in 
the Promise compared to the No Promise condition at p ≤ 0.01 (**) or p ≤ 0.005 (***). 
Finally, the scatter plots demonstrates that the return rates are negatively correlated with 
activity in the ACC (r = -.41, p < 0.05) and left DLPFC (r = -.40, p < 0.05) during decision 
phase A as well as left amygdala (r = -.40, p < 0.05) during decision phase B. 
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Supplementary methods 
Exclusion of subjects 
7 subjects out of 34 had to be excluded due to the following design constraints: number of 
analyzable files and inconsistent behavioral pattern. If subjects were confronted with 
investors who showed a very low trusting behavior, specifically during trust trials without 
promise stage, two problems emerged for the data analyses. First, the number of analyzable 
files was reduced, which is in particular a problem for the analysis of the brain data and 
second, such a low trust rate might affect the trustworthiness behavior in other trials of the 
trust game. We used a threshold value of six or more negative trust decisions (mean ± SE of 
the analyzed 26 subjects: 3.05 ± 0.32 negative trust decisions in trials without promise stage 
and 0.65 ± 0.18 in trust trials with promise stage). Thus, if subjects faced 6 or more investors 
who decided not to trust either during trust trials with or without antecedent promise stage, we 
excluded these subjects from any further analyses. This led to the exclusion of four subjects. 
In addition, three other subjects had to be excluded because they showed a very inconsistent 
behavioral pattern qualified by return rate differences between trust trials with and without 
antecedent promise stage from 67% to 83% percentage (mean ± SE of the analyzed 26 
subjects: 10% ± 3.6). While such a strong change is behaviorally interesting, differences in 
brain activation patterns between trials with and without antecedent promise stage cannot be 
interpreted in clear cut manner in such a group because either the promise (= the intended 
effect) or the different decisions and associated payoffs in trials with and without promise 
stage (see introduction and result sections for further details) can cause such differences.  
 
Behavioral pilot experiments and social interactions in the fMRI scanner  
The parameters of the fMRI experiment were determined with the help of behavioral pilot 
experiments with a total of 48 subjects who each played 20 trials of the trust game paradigm 
(for details on the trust game paradigm see Fig. 1). We found that the investors in this pilot 
experiment trust in about 74% of the cases in trust game trials without promise stage. The 
trusting behavior was, as expected, dependent on the promise level in trust game trials with 
antecedent promise stage. Player A’s trust rates were from the lowest promise levels (to never 
pay back money) to the highest promise levels (to always pay back money) as follows: 0% (to 
never pay back money), 46% (to sometimes pay back money), 75% (to mostly pay back 
money) and 96% (to always pay back money). The investors’ choices from the pilot 
experiment were then used as an input for the scanner experiment. If, for example, a trustee 
had chosen the highest promise level of “always pay back money”, the trustee faced a positive 
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trust decision by the investor with a probability of 96%. Importantly, the trustees' decisions 
had real monetary payoff consequences for the investors. For that purpose, we asked the 
investors at the end of the pilot experiments whether we could “reuse” their decisions in other 
sessions of this experiment. If they agreed and we actually used their decisions (implemented 
as described above) in the scanner experiment, they were paid (per mail) dependent on player 
B’s decision in the scanner. Thus, the trustees in the scanner faced the decisions of 24 real 
human interaction partners and their choices actually affected the interaction partners' 
monetary payoffs. 
 
Procedure in the fMRI scanner 
The computer screens that the subjects needed to see during the 24 trust game trials (Fig. 2 
depicts the timeline for two trials of the trust game with and without antecedent promise 
stage) were presented via a video projector onto a translucent screen that subjects viewed 
inside the scanner via a mirror. At the beginning of each trial, the subjects were presented a 
fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 10 to 12 seconds (randomly jittered in the 
interval 10-12s). In 8 of the 24 trials, this fixation screen was followed by the screen of the 
promise stage during which subjects had to choose their promise level for three subsequent 
trust game trials or during which they were informed that the three subsequent trust game 
trials are played without promise. In order to implement the promise decision, 4 buttons 
representing the four possible promise levels were presented on the screen of the promise 
stage. Within a time restriction of 9 seconds, subjects had to implement their decision by 
means of a 4-button input device. During promise stages without promise option, subjects 
nevertheless had to press the response button labeled “click here”. This procedure controlled 
for basic visual perceptions and motor responses. After the promise stage, the subjects were 
again presented a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 10 to 12 seconds (randomly 
jittered in the interval 10-12s). Then the anticipation stage lasting 6 seconds began. During 
this stage, subjects were informed that player A was now deciding whether to trust or not to 
trust the subjects. No response had to be made during this stage of the paradigm. After this 
anticipation stage, the decision stage followed which was divided into two different phases, 
labeled decision phase A and B. During decision phase A subjects received the information 
about the investor’s trust decision (whether he trusted or not). This phase lasted 6 seconds. 
After these 6 seconds, subjects entered into decision phase B during which an additional 
information was presented on the same decision screen, namely they were either reminded of 
their given promise level or that they could not make a promise decision for this trial of the 
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trust game. This information was presented for 3 seconds. Only after these 9 seconds, two 
response buttons were presented on the same decision screen which enabled the subjects to 
implement their decision, that is to be trustworthy or not. In cases when the investor decided 
not to trust and thus the subjects could not make a decision, they nevertheless had to press the 
response button labeled “click here”. Subjects had to implement their decision (whether to be 
trustworthy or not) or the indicated button press within a time restriction of 7 seconds. Finally, 
the payoff for both players was depicted during the profit stage lasting 6 seconds, and the 
subjects received the information that a new investor has now been assigned to them. The 
software package z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), a program for conducting behavioral 
experiments in combination with neuroimaging, was used for presenting screens and for 
collecting behavioral and timing data.  
 
Prior to scanning, subjects read written instructions describing the sequence of events, the 
payoff rules, and the details of the promise, anticipation, and decision stages. After the 
subjects had read the instructions, we checked whether they understood the payoff rules and 
the treatment conditions by means of several hypothetical questions. All subjects answered 
the control questions correctly. Thus, all subjects knew that the whole experiment would last 
for 24 trials, that they played the game with 24 different and anonymous human interaction 
partners, that half of the trials were played with promise stage and that they either could hold 
or break their promise during the decision stage of the paradigm. 
 
Behavioral analyses  
We created two return rate indexes for the behavioral data (return decisions) – one for trust 
game trials with antecedent promise stage and one for trials without antecedent promise stage. 
The indexes measure player B’s average return rate for the trust game trials in which player A 
trusted, i.e. the percentage of cases in which B proved trustworthy and equalized payoffs. 
Using these two behavioral indexes, we first performed a hierarchical cluster analysis based 
on the Ward method (using the squared Euclidean distance measure) in order to classify our 
subjects into different subgroups. This cluster analysis revealed a cluster solution with two 
strongly separated clusters (see dendrogram of supplementary Fig. 1). In order to validate and 
clarify the classification profile (the assignment of the different subjects to the two clusters), 
we further performed a non-hierarchical cluster analysis using the k-means procedure 
(number of clusters predetermined based on the Ward method = 2). This procedure confirmed 
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the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis and thus no subjects had to be assigned to a 
different cluster.    
 
We created 4 indexes for the behavioral data of the promise stage, consisting of the average 
promise level as a percentage, broken down for the 4 possible promise levels. Because 
subjects almost always chose one of the highest two promise levels, we focused on these two 
promise levels in the analysis (see results section for details). Finally, we created 2 indexes for 
each of the remaining two behavioral measures, including player A's trust rate and response 
times, consisting of the average trust rate or response times (as a percentage or in seconds, 
respectively), broken down for trust trials played with and without antecedent promise stage. 
With respect to response times measured both during the promise and decision stage, we 
excluded for the generation of  the mean of the decision stage all those trials during which 
player A did not trust player B and thus did not have to make a decision. We used the 
statistical software package SPSS 13 for PC (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) for the different 
analyses of the behavioral data (return rate of player B, promise level of player B, trust rate of 
player A and response times of player B) and ROIs of the brain data. Please see results section 
for details about the statistical tests conducted, including independent t-tests, simple t-tests, 
and repeated measures ANOVA. Results were considered significant at the level of p < 0.05 
(two-tailed). In case of a significant multivariate effects, post hoc paired t-tests were 
computed using the Bonferroni correction according to Holm (Holm, 1979). As effect size 
measure ETA2 is reported.  
 
fMRI analysis:  Preprocessing 
For the preprocessing and statistical analyses, the statistical parametric mapping software 
package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) implemented 
in Matlab (Version 7) were used. For analysis, all images were realigned to the first volume, 
corrected for motion artifacts and time of acquisition within a TR, normalized (3 × 3 × 3 
mm3) into standard stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A 
band-pass filter, which was composed of a discrete cosine-basis function with a cut-off trial of 
128 seconds for the high-pass filter was applied. In order to increase signal to noise ratio, 
global intensity changes were minimized by scaling each image to the grand mean.  
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fMRI analysis: General linear model (GLM) 
We performed random-effects analyses on the functional data for the promise, anticipation, 
and decision stages. For that purpose, we defined the following general linear model (GLM). 
The first two regressors in the design matrix of the GLM represent the promise stage, either 
with opportunity to give a promise for three subsequent trust trials or without such an 
opportunity. Each of these two regressors consisted of 4 trials whose length was individually 
modeled based on the subjects’ button press. Importantly, in order to simplify the 
nomenclature, we will in the following refer to all 12 anticipation and decision trials for 
which subjects could give a promise as trials with antecedent promise stage, whereas the other 
12 trials of the anticipation and decision stages for which subjects could not give a promise 
are referred to as trials without antecedent promise stage. The next two regressors in the 
design matrix represent the anticipation stage either with antecedent promise stage or without. 
Both regressors consisted of 12 trials, all of which lasted 6 seconds and were modeled 
accordingly. During these 6 seconds, subjects received the information that the investors were 
now deciding whether to trust or not. The next 8 regressors modeled the decision stage 
separately for decision phases A and B. Both decision phases were thus represented by the 
following 4 regressor: decision trials with antecedent promise stage and Player A decided to 
trust / decision trials with antecedent promise stage and Player A decided not to trust / 
decision trials without antecedent promise stage and Player A decided to trust / decision trials 
without antecedent promise stage and Player A decided not to trust. Because all players B 
showed a very consistent behavioral pattern both with respect to their decisions about 
trustworthiness and promise level (see behavioral results and Fig. 3), the decision regressors 
were not further modeled according to player B’s trustworthiness or promise decisions. Thus, 
all brain imaging results of the decision stage are based on all decision trials, excluding only 
those trials during which player B could not make a decision because Player A did not trust 
him. The length of the regressors for decision phase A was modeled with 6 seconds, whereas 
the length of the regressors for decision phase B was individually modeled based on the 
subjects’ button press. Finally, the profit stage lasted 6 seconds and was modeled with two 
regressors representing trust game trials with and without antecedent promise stage. Because 
this profit stage does not involve any new information or decision process for the subjects 
lying in the scanner, we did not further focus on this stage during the analysis of the brain 
data.  
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We also defined an additional GLM which involved the same regressors for the promise, 
anticipation and profit stages as described above. The only exception concerns the decision 
stage. Instead of separately modeling decision phases A and B, we created a decision 
regressor which modeled the decision epoch as a whole, i.e. from onset decision screen in 
decision phase A until implementation of the decision via button press in decision phase B 
(mean duration 10.13 seconds). Thus, the decision stage of this model only consisted of 4 and 
not 8 regressors (see above). We report brain imaging results in the paper with respect to all 
three decision regressors (see Fig. 6 and 7).  
 
All regressors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF). The 
6 scan-to-scan motion parameters produced during realignment were included as additional 
regressors in the SPM analysis to account for residual effects of scan to scan motion.  
 
Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the individual subject level and 
then taken to a group level random effects analysis of variance. For all stages of the paradigm 
(promise, anticipation, decision), we calculated the following t-contrast at the individual level: 
trials with promise stage (present or antecedent) > trials without promise stage (present or 
antecedent); this contrast is referred to as “promise > no promise” in the following. We also 
calculated the reversed t-contrast of “no promise > promise” for the anticipation stage (see 
results section for explanation). For second-level random effects analysis, the single-subject 
contrasts were entered into independent t-tests with factor group (dishonest/honest), 
separately for each stage of the paradigm. Based on these independent t-tests, we calculated 
for each stage of the paradigm the following two serial subtraction terms: Dishonest group 
(promise > no promise) > Honest group (promise > no promise) and vice versa, Honest 
group (promise > no promise) > Dishonest group (promise > no promise). We calculated the 
same serial subtraction terms for the anticipation stage, but the reversed t-contrasts “no 
promise > promise” were used instead (see result section for explanation).  
 
fMRI  analysis: Data extraction using functionally defined ROIs 
In order to test for specificity both between stages (promise, anticipation, decision) and within 
stages (phase A and B of the decision stage), we created ROIs using the MarsBaR software 
and extracted Beta-estimates for all hypothesized regions showing significant activations 
based on the described serial subtraction terms. ROIs for all regions were defined by a 
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functional criterion by selecting all voxels that were significantly (p < 0.005) activated in the 
corresponding serial subtraction term. 
 
fMRI analysis: Correction for multiple comparisons 
The correction for multiple comparisons was carried out using a 3-step approach: First, we 
applied an uncorrected p-value of 0.005 combined with a cluster-size threshold of 10 voxels 
(Forman et al., 1995) to our a priori regions of interests (see introduction section for details), 
including in particular areas of the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
amygdala, the striatum, and the anterior insula. Other brain regions, which are significant at 
the same threshold, are also reported (see supplementary Tables S1-S3). However, we are 
reluctant to make any interpretations based on these results because we made no a priori 
hypotheses. Second, all serial subtraction terms were inclusively masked at p < 0.005 with the 
first contrast of the serial subtraction term. Thus, we restricted our analyses of group 
differences to regions already activated within the respective group alone. The application of 
this within-subjects masking procedure further reduces the probability of false positives due 
the fact that the same voxels had to be significantly activated both in the between-subjects 
(serial subtraction term) and the within-subjects contrast. Third, we checked whether our a 
priori regions of interests (depicted in Figures 4-7) survive small volume family-wise-error 
(FWE) corrections at p < 0.05. For that purpose, we used the WFU-PickAtlas toolbox 
(Maldjian et al., 2003) in order to define anatomical ROI’s based on the automated anatomical 
labelling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) included in this toolbox. Thus, we created the 
following anatomical ROI’s based on the discussed literature in the introduction section: left 
and right insula, left and right ACC, intersected with BA 24 and BA 32, left and right IFG, 
left and right striatum, left and right middle frontal gyrus, intersected with BA 9, BA 10 and 
BA 46, and left and right amygdala. Crucially, all but two of our regions of interests depicted 
in Figures 4-7 (including anterior insula/fronto-insular cortex, ACC, amygdala, IFG) survived 
these small volume family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05. The only exceptions are 
the DLPFC and striatum, which show a trend for significance at p < 0.10. However, if we 
include in the striatum ROI only hypothesized areas of the ventral striatum (below z = 2) and 
in the DLPFC only anterior regions of the PFC (anterior to y = 45) often shown to be 
activated by previous deception studies (for reviews see Sip et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2004), 
these regions also become significant at p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected). Finally, due to the fact 
that we tested in each stage (promise, anticipation, decision) different hypotheses and 
associated brain regions, we additionally conducted stage-specific Bonferroni corrections 
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according to Holm (1979) in order to correct for the number of tested regions in each stage of 
our paradigm. All regions survived this additional Bonferroni correction.    
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Table S1: Promise stage  
 
 
Brain regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels 
Promise stage 
Frontal Lobe 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 24 L -6 33 6 4.41 **** 30 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
(Frontoinsular Cortex)  
47/13 L -30 24 -18 4.02 *** 20 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  
(Frontoinsular cortex) 
47/38 R 42 15 -24 3.89 *** 
o Frontoinsular Cortex  47/13 R 36 21 -15 3.41 * 
47 
Occipital Lobe 
Dishonest > Honest 
(P-NoP)D – (P-NoP)H   
 
 
Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 R 33 -72 3 3.37 * 13 
Honest > Dishonest 
(P-NoP)H – (P-NoP)D   
 
No suprathreshold cluster 
 
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space, together with its T-scores and significant thresholds (*P 
< 0.005, ** P < 0.001, *** P < 0.0005, **** P < 0.0001 (all uncorrected for multiple comparisons). Minimum 
cluster size: 10 voxels. P denotes with promise, NoP denotes without promise, D denotes dishonest group, H 
denotes honest group. All maxima are reported. The serial subtraction term is masked inclusively at p < 0.005 
using the first contrast of the serial subtraction term. ° denotes sub peaks in the same cluster of voxels. Regions 
of interest discussed in the paper are in italic. These regions of interests survive small volume family-wise-error 
(FWE) corrections at p < 0.05 (see method section for details).  
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Table S2: Anticipation stage 
 
 
 
Brain regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels 
Anticipation stage 
Parietal Lobe 
Angular Gyrus 39 L -45 -66 36      4.64     **** 12 
Dishonest > Honest 
(P-NoP)D – (P-NoP)H
 
Temporal Lobe 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 37 R 51 -57 -3      3.85     *** 16 
Honest > Dishonest 
(P-NoP)H – (P-NoP)D
 
Frontal Lobe 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 R 57 12 6 3.80 *** 18 
Temporal Lobe 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 37 L -36 -66 6 4.87 **** 11 
Middle Insula  13 R 45 0 6 4.36 *** 
o Anterior Insula 13 R 42 15 0 3.90 *** 
36 
Parietal Lobe 
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 23 R 9 -30 21 3.98 *** 18 
Precuneus 7 R 21 -72 60 3.15 * 
Dishonest > Honest 
(NoP-P)D – (NoP-P)H
o Precuneus 7 R 24 -72 51 3.03 * 
10 
Honest > Dishonest 
(NoP-P)H – (NoP-P)D No suprathreshold cluster 
 
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space, together with its T-scores and significant thresholds (*P 
< 0.005, ** P < 0.001, *** P < 0.0005, **** P < 0.0001 (all uncorrected for multiple comparisons). Minimum 
cluster size: 10 voxels. P denotes with promise, NoP denotes without promise, D denotes dishonest group, H 
denotes honest group. All maxima are reported. The serial subtraction term is masked inclusively at p < 0.005 
using the first contrast of the serial subtraction term. ° denotes sub peaks in the same cluster of voxels. Regions 
of interest discussed in the paper are in italic. These regions of interests survive small volume family-wise-error 
(FWE) corrections at p < 0.05 (see methods section for details). 
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Table S3: Decision stage (Phase A + B)  
 
 
Brain regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels 
Decision phase A+B (modeled together)  
Subcortical Structures 
Ventral Striatum  R 24 12 0 3.54 ** 23 
Dishonest > Honest 
(P-NoP)D – (P-NoP)H
 
Honest > Dishonest 
(P-NoP)H – (P-NoP)D No suprathreshold cluster 
Decision phase A (separately modeled) 
Frontal Lobe 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 L -33 3 54 3.71 ** 18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 
(DLPFC) 
10/46 L -39 54 15 3.27 * 22 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 6 -6 63 3.57 ** 11 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 R 21 18 63 3.04   * 11 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 24 L -6 27 18 3.86 * 11 
Temporal Lobe 
Dishonest > Honest 
(P-NoP)D – (P-NoP)H
Posterior Insula 13 L -36 -42 15 3.39 * 11 
Honest > Dishonest 
No suprathreshold cluster (P-NoP)H – (P-NoP)D
Decision phase B (separately modeled) 
Parietal Lobe 
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 31 R 24 -33 45 3.27 
 
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space, together with its T-scores and significant thresholds (*P 
< 0.005, ** P < 0.001, *** P < 0.0005, **** P < 0.0001 (all uncorrected for multiple comparisons). Minimum 
cluster size: 10 voxels. P denotes with promise, NoP denotes without promise, D denotes dishonest group, H 
denotes honest group. All maxima are reported. The serial subtraction term is masked inclusively at p < 0.005 
using the first contrast of the serial subtraction term. ° denotes sub peaks in the same cluster of voxels. Regions 
of interest discussed in the paper are in italic. These regions of interests survive small volume family-wise-error 
(FWE) corrections at p < 0.05 (see methods section for details). 
 
 
 
* 12 
Subcortical Structures 
Dishonest > Honest 
(P-NoP)D – (P-NoP)H
Amygdala  L -30 0 -21 3.77 *** 13 
Honest > Dishonest 
(P-NoP)H – (P-NoP)D No suprathreshold cluster 
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Table S4: Independent t-tests of all functional decision stage ROIs 
 
ROIs Phase A+B Phase A Phase B 
Ventral striatum p = 0.001 p = 0.075 p = 0.140 
DLPFC p = 0.039 p = 0.004 p = 0.208 
ACC p = 0.063 p = 0.002 p = 0.140 
Amygdala p = 0.811 p = 0.004 p = 0.101 
 
Supplementary Table S4: Independent t-tests based on Beta-estimates showed a phase-
specific activation pattern in all functional ROIs of the decision stage, i.e. the by far highest 
differential group effect (depicted in orange color) was either observed in decision phase A, 
decision phase B, or during the whole decision period (phase A+B).  
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Table S5: Brief symptom inventory scales  
 
Psychological 
symptom scales 
Honest  
group 
Dishonest 
group 
Independent 
T-test  
Corr with 
return rates 
Obsessive-compulsive 1.85 ± .60 1.64 ± .46 p = .37 r = .12 p = .63 
Interpersonal 
sensitivity 1.34 ± .44 1.34 ± .38 p = .99 
r = .14 
p = .58 
Depression 1.37 ± .42 1.50 ± .48 p = .55 r = .04 p = .86 
Anxiety 1.58 ± .47 1.43 ± .45 p = .48 r = -.02 p = .93 
Somatisation 1.39 ± .54 1.20 ± .25  p = .39 r = .14 p = .58 
Aggression / Hostility 1.80 ± .78 1.49 ± .42 p = .33 r = .22 p = .39 
Phobic anxiety 1.15 ± .27 1.07 ± .10 p = .49 r = .21 p = .41 
Paranoid ideation 1.57 ± .72 1.43 ± .37 p = .61 r = .09 p = .71 
Psychoticism 1.42 ± .40 1.27 ± .35 p = .38 r = .22 p = .38 
 
Depicted are means ± s.d. of the brief symptom inventory scales, brief psychological self-
report symptom scales (5-point scale, ranging from 1 to 5). High values indicate higher 
psychological symptoms. None of the group means of either the honest or the dishonest group 
were in the clinically noticeable range. Independent t-Tests between the honest and dishonest 
group revealed no significant differences between groups. Furthermore, correlation of return 
rates with the psychological symptom scales also revealed no significant result. Thus, the two 
groups do not differ with respect to the psychological symptom scales and furthermore, these 
psychological symptoms can not explain the highly differential behavior pattern between the 
subjects.  
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Table S6: NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI)  
 
Personality scales Honest  group 
Dishonest 
group 
Independent 
T-test  
Corr with 
return rates 
Neuroticism 2.5 ± .71  2.2  ± .62  p = .37  r = .31 p = .22 
Extraversion 3.2 ± .43 3.3 ± .49 p = .62 r = -.23 p = .36 
Openness to 
experiences 3.9 ± .54  3.9 ± .39 p = .91 
r = .21 
p = .39 
Agreeableness 3.4 ± .34 3.5 ± .44 p = .44 r = .05 p = .83 
Conscientiousness 3.5 ± .48 3.3 ± .66 p = .30 r = .27  p = .29 
 
Depicted are means ± s.d. of the NEO-FFI (Costa and McCrae, 1992), consisting of 5 
personality scales (5-point scales, ranging from 1 to 5). High values indicate a higher degree 
of the personality trait. Independent t-Tests between the honest and dishonest group revealed 
no significant differences between groups. Furthermore, correlation of return rates with the 
personality scales also revealed no significant result. Thus, the two groups do not differ with 
respect to these personality traits and furthermore, the degree of these personality traits cannot 
explain the highly differential behavior pattern between the subjects.  
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Table S7: Machiavelli questionnaire  
 
Personality scales Honest  group 
Dishonest 
group 
Independent 
T-test  
Corr with 
return rates 
Tactics  3.4 ± .55 3.7 ± .71 p = .21 r = -.27 p = .29 
Cynicism  4.6 ± .90  4.4 ± .67 p = .43 r = .02 p = .94 
Total scale  4.0 ± .53 4.03 ± .56 p = .87 r = -.17 p = .50 
 
Depicted are means ± s.d. of the Machiavelli questionnaire (Christie and Geis, 1970), 
consisting of 2 subscales and one total scale (7-point scales, ranging from 1 to 7). One 
subscale (tactics) measures how Machiavellian a subject is, and the other subscale (cynicism) 
measures how Machiavellian a subject expects other people to be. High values indicate a 
higher degree of this personality trait. Independent t-Tests between the honest and dishonest 
groups revealed no significant differences between groups. Furthermore, correlation of return 
rates with the personality scales also revealed no significant result. Thus, the two groups do 
not differ with respect to these personality traits and furthermore, the degree of these 
personality traits cannot explain the highly differential behavior pattern between the subjects.  
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Figure S1: Dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis using 
the Ward method 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1: The cluster analysis using each subjects' two return rates as 
dependent variables revealed a cluster solution with two strongly separated clusters, indicated 
by large distances (squared Euclidian distances) between the two clusters. The distances 
within the two clusters are very small, however. Thus, this cluster analysis revealed two 
groups of subjects who showed a very different return rate pattern between groups, but a very 
similar pattern within their respective groups.   
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Analysis S1: Exclusive masking  
As extensively discussed in the main manuscript (please see introduction and results section), 
we conducted serial subtraction term analysis in order to control for differences in fairness-
related behavior and associated payoffs between promise-keepers and promise-breakers. Here 
we include an additional control procedure on top of this serial subtraction term analysis 
which consists of creating an exclusive mask from the high-low payoff (unfair minus fair 
trials) and reporting only regions outside these for the serial subtraction term analysis. We 
applied this masking procedure at all stages of the paradigm (a different mask for each stage) 
using a conservative threshold of p < 0.05 (exclusive threshold). Crucially, the serial 
subtraction term analysis (thresholded at p < 0.005) calculated with and without these 
exclusive masks (see Figure below) revealed that none of the region of interests (framed by 
colored rectangles on the axial view of the glass brain) were excluded by this masking 
procedure and even the cluster size of each activity was not reduced. It even was slightly 
increased in same regions (e.g see the DLPFC in phase A of the decision stage) due to the fact 
that the exclusive masking procedure reduced the analysis volume and thus slightly increased 
the statistical power. Importantly, the finding that this exclusive masking procedure did not 
affect any regions of interests provides further strong evidence that the brain activity patterns 
are not confounded by difference in fairness-related behavior and associated payoffs.  
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Analysis S2: Stage-specificity of the activity patterns 
 
In the main manuscript (see results section for details), we provided evidence using functional 
regions of interests that the differential activity patterns between dishonest and honest 
subjects are stage-specific, that is can either be found in the promise, anticipation, or decision 
stage (Phase A, phase B or Phase A+B) of the paradigm. Here we conducted an additional 
analysis to further substantiate this evidence by means of a less biased procedure than the use 
of functional regions of interests (for explanation see below). For that purpose, we calculated 
all described serial subtraction terms at a very lenient threshold of p < 0.05 (uncorrected) and 
saved the resulting statistical parametrical maps (SPMs). Then, we used MRIcroN to 
simultaneously plot all SPMs in order to examine which of the stages activate the 
hypothesized regions of interests at this lenient threshold. This approach is superior to the use 
of functional regions of interests because it not only allows looking for significant differences 
in the functional cluster, but rather in the entire anatomical regions (e.g. Insula, ACC, inferior 
frontal gyrus, amygdala).  
 
The findings of these additional analyses revealed that each of these regions is differently 
activated only during a specific stage of the paradigm (see Figure below). These additional 
analyses thus confirmed the results of the functional cluster analyses reported in the main 
manuscript. In detail, the insular region (see black rectangle in A and B), including anterior 
insula (in blue color) and fronto-insular cortex (in red color), was only differentially activated 
in the anticipation and promise stage, respectively. On the other hand, neighboring areas of 
the ACC (see black rectangle in C) demonstrated a differential activity pattern only during the 
promise stage (in red color) and during phase A of the decision stage (in green color). The 
amygdala (see violet rectangle in D) and the ventral striatum (see yellow rectangle in E) were 
differentially activated only during phase B of the decision stage and during the whole 
decision stage (phase A and B), respectively. Finally, the DLPFC (see green rectangle in A) 
and the rIFG (see blue rectangle in B) were only differentially activated during phase A of 
decision stage and the anticipation stage, respectively.   
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Analysis S3: Separating out non-conform group trials in the 
decision stage 
 
As discussed in the method section of the manuscript, the decision regressors were not further 
modeled according to player B’s trustworthiness because all players B showed a very 
consistent behavioral pattern, that is were either trustworthily (honest group) or 
untrustworthily (dishonest group). However, there are a few trials in which some subjects 
showed a behavioral decision not in conformity to the assigned group based on the highly 
significant cluster analyses (honest decisions in the dishonest group and dishonest decisions in 
the honest group). In two additional GLMs, we thus separated out these non-conform group 
trials. Findings revealed that the main activity pattern still can be observed in each phase of 
the decision stage (phase A, phase B, and phase A+B), even with a slightly increased t-value 
in most regions of interests (amygdala, DLPFC and ACC). Therefore, this finding clearly 
demonstrates that these trials contribute little to the observed differential activity pattern in the 
decision stage of our paradigm. 
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